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DOES IT MATTER WHO IS IN CHARGE
OF EVIDENCE LAW?
Eleanor Swift *
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1982 and again in 1990, initiative measures were placed on the
ballot in California aimed at "reform of the criminal justice system as it
relates to the actual and potential victims of crime."' Included in the
package of proposed constitutional amendments and new legislation were
significant changes in the character rule and the hearsay rule under Cali-
fornia evidence law. Both initiatives passed.'
Although conclusive judicial interpretation of the initiatives' impact
is yet to come, the goal of the drafters in changing the character and
hearsay rules is clear: reducing restrictions on the government's tactical
choice of proof to make convictions easier to obtain. But this effect on
trial outcome is not the whole story. Changes in the character and hear-
say rules will also change the moral claims of our criminal justice system
and shift the balance of burdens between prosecution and defendant.
And, given the success of the two initiatives, we can expect more propos-
als in this direction, both in California and elsewhere.
Thus, California's experiment with populist evidence law reform
raises an important question for people who think that evidence law does
matter: who ought to be in charge of it? The popular initiative chal-
lenges the bench, bar, legal academy and ultimately the legislature, as the
institutional actors who have in the past served as the repositories of
wisdom and authority over the process of proof at trial. It focuses our
attention on the proper role of the public in making value judgments
about this process. And, assuming the legitimacy of the public's role, it
requires us to examine whether the initiative process is suited for making
* Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley, School of Law; B.A., 1967, Rad-
cliffe College; L.L.B., 1970, Yale Law School.
1. Brosnahan v. Brown, 32 Cal. 3d 236, 273, 651 P.2d 274, 296, 186 Cal. Rptr. 30, 52
(1982) (Bird, C.J., dissenting, quoting Respondents' Brief). CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET,
PRIMARY ELECTION JUNE 8, 1982 AND JUNE 5, 1990.
2. Proposition 8 passed by a vote of 2,826,081 to 2,182,710 on June 8, 1982. Paul Gann,
Justice for the Accuser: Proposition 8-The Victims' Bill of Rights, 4 BENCHMARK 69, 71
(1989). Proposition 115 passed by a vote of 2,540,352 to 1,923,513 on June 5, 1990. State
Propositions, S.F. CHRON., June 7, 1990, at All.
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the kind of evidence policy changes that affect the moral and procedural
foundations of our system of justice.
II. PROPOSITION 8: CHANGES IN THE RULES AGAINST USE OF
CHARACTER EVIDENCE
Proposition 8, adopted in June of 1982, added section 28(d), denom-
inated the "Right to Truth-in-Evidence," to article I of the California
Constitution. It stated:
Except as provided by statute hereafter enacted by a two-thirds
vote of the membership in each house of the Legislature, rele-
vant evidence shall not be excluded in any criminal proceeding,
including pretrial and post conviction motions and hearings, or
in any trial or hearing of a juvenile for a criminal offense,
whether heard in juvenile or adult court. Nothing in this section
shall affect any existing statutory rule of evidence relating to
privilege or hearsay, or Evidence Code, Sections 352, 782 or
1103. Nothing in this section shall affect any existing statutory
or constitutional right of the press.3
Although aimed primarily at the California exclusionary rule and the
California Supreme Court's liberal interpretations of the United States
Constitution's Fourth Amendment proscription of unreasonable searches
and seizures,4 this constitutional provision appeared to abolish all spe-
cific restrictions on the use of all types of character evidence-reputa-
tion, opinion and specific acts-to prove propensity to commit the
charged crime or to testify truthfully. Under California Evidence Code
section 352, similar to Federal Rule of Evidence 403, the trial judge
would still retain discretion to exclude character evidence after weighing
its prejudice against its probative value. Sections 782 and 1103 of the
California Evidence Code would also remain in force to protect victims
of sex offenses against the indiscriminate use of their prior sexual his-
tory.' At a minimum, commentators predicted a radical transformation
in the use of character evidence in criminal trials.6
3. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(d) (emphasis added).
4. Section 28(d) did not repeal California Penal Code § 1538.5, the California exclusion-
ary rule, but did abolish any interpretation of it more strict than the federal constitutional
counterpart. See generally Mark D. Klein & Randall A. Cohen, Proposition 8. California Law
After In re Lance W. and People v. Castro, 12 PEPP. L. REV. 1059 (1985) (analyzing cases
dealing with Proposition 8 and recognizing public's desire to decrease level of constitutional
protection to criminal defendants).
5. CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 352, 782, 1103 (West 1966 & Supp. 1992).
6. For a detailed analysis of the predicted effect of Proposition 8 on all aspects of charac-
ter evidence in California, see Miguel A. Mendez, California's New Law on Character Evi-
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Proposition 8 also added section 28(f) to article I of the California
Constitution, specifically addressing the use of prior convictions for im-
peachment purposes in criminal trials:
Any prior felony conviction of any person in any criminal pro-
ceeding, whether adult or juvenile, shall subsequently be used
without limitation for purposes of impeachment or enhancement
of sentence in any criminal proceeding. When a prior felony
conviction is an element of any felony offense, it shall be proven
to the trier of fact in open court.7
This provision was intended to abolish a line of California Supreme
Court cases delineating the bounds of permissible impeachment by re-
quiring the trial court to consider: (1) the prior felony's relation to hon-
esty and integrity; (2) its remoteness in time; (3) its similarity to the
crime charged; and (4) the effect of its admission on the defendant's deci-
sion to testify.8
III. PROPOSITION 115: PERMITTING THE USE OF HEARSAY IN
PRELIMINARY HEARINGS
The voters of California again rewrote a part of evidence law in June
of 1990. Proposition 115 worked fundamental changes in the proof pro-
cess at preliminary hearings, where the vast majority of felony com-
plaints in California are initiated upon a finding of "sufficient cause to
believe that the defendant is guilty."9
First, Proposition 115 specifically approved the admission of hear-
say at preliminary hearings by adding section 30(b) to article I of the
constitution. 10 Second, it implemented this new constitutional section
dence: Evidence Code Section 352 and the Impact of Recent Psychological Studies, 31 UCLA
L. REv. 1003 (1984). Other areas of evidence law that could be affected by § 28(d) are lay and
expert opinion testimony, the use of scientific evidence and the use of psychiatric evidence
concerning credibility. Id. at 1031-37. Chief Justice Bird also predicted effects on the law of
competency, personal knowledge and admissibility of religious beliefs. Brosnahan v. Brown,
32 Cal. 3d 236, 278-79, 651 P.2d 274, 300, 186 Cal. Rptr. 30, 56 (1982).
7. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(f) (emphasis added).
8. See, e.g., People v. Castro, 38 Cal. 3d 301, 307-09, 696 P.2d 111, 114-15, 211 Cal.
Rptr. 719, 721-23 (1985).
9. CAL. PENAL CODE § 872(a) (West 1985 & Supp. 1992).
10. The new § 30(b) reads as follows: "In order to protect victims and witnesses in crimi-
nal cases, hearsay evidence shall be admissible at preliminary hearings, as prescribed by the
Legislature or by the people through the initiative process." CAL. CONST. art. I, § 30(b).
Under previous California Supreme Court precedent, the use of hearsay at preliminary hear-
ings had been found to violate due process under the state constitution when the defendant was
required to make "reasonable efforts" to secure the presence of the declarant as a condition
precedent to objecting. Mills v. Superior Court, 42 Cal. 3d 951, 958, 728 P.2d 211, 214, 232
Cal. Rptr. 141, 144 (1986).
April 1992]
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30(b) by creating a statutory "law officer" exception to the hearsay rule
in section 872(b) of the California Penal Code. II Under this "law officer"
exception, Proposition 115 authorized holding criminal defendants to an-
swer on felony charges based upon hearsay statements made to police
officers. For instance, out-of-court statements of eyewitnesses or victims
concerning such critical facts as the identity of the perpetrator could be
substituted for the declarant's live testimony.
Moreover, Proposition 115 further insulated these hearsay state-
ments by prohibiting the defendant from calling and cross-examining any
hearsay declarants whose out-of-court statements were admitted under
this "law officer" exception. 2 And further, Penal Code sections 866(a)
and (b) were amended to condition the right of the defendant to call any
witnesses at all. Upon the request of the prosecuting attorney, the judge
shall not allow any defense witness to testify unless the defense makes an
"offer of proof" that satisfies the judge that the testimony would be "rea-
sonably likely to establish an affirmative defense, negate an element of a
crime charged, or impeach the testimony of a prosecution witness or the
statement of a declarant testified to by a prosecution witness."' 3
IV. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THESE CHANGES IN CALIFORNIA
EVIDENCE LAW
The character rule and the hearsay rule are not insignificant targets.
Other than the overarching requirement of relevance, they are perhaps
the two most basic principles of exclusion in Anglo-American evidence
law. Both bodies of law involve primary rules of exclusion and excep-
tions (and some counter exceptions) that have developed during the past
several hundred years.
A description of the overall significance of these rules for our system
of proof is beyond the scope of this Essay. Recent scholarship empha-
11. Notwithstanding Evidence Code § 1200 (the hearsay rule), "the finding of probable
cause may be based in whole or in part upon the sworn testimony of a law enforcement officer
relating the statements of declarants made out of court offered for the truth of the matter
asserted." CAL. PENAL CODE § 872(b) (West Supp. 1992). Any law enforcement officer testi-
fying as to hearsay statements must either have five years of law enforcement experience or
have completed a training course certified by the Commission on Peace Officer Standards and
Training, which includes training in the investigation and reporting of cases and testifying at
preliminary hearings. Id.
12. Section 1203.1 added to the Evidence Code reads as follows: "Section 1203 [providing
that a declarant may be called and examined as if on cross-examination by the adverse party] is
not applicable if the hearsay statement is offered at a preliminary examination, as provided in
Section 872 of the Penal Code." CAL. EVID. CODE § 1203.1 (West Supp. 1992).
13. CAL. PENAL CODE § 866(a) (West Supp. 1992).
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sizes that these rules derive from many sources of values14 and serve
many functions at trial.15 In practical terms, both rules limit the govern-
ment's tactical choice of proof in criminal trials. For the question raised
here-whether decisions to amend these rules should be made by direct
popular vote-two defining effects of these limits will be considered:
they make a moral claim for our system of criminal justice and they set
the respective balance of burdens between the prosecutor and the defend-
ant. A brief discussion of these effects suggests the significance of the
changes worked by Propositions 8 and 115. The adequacy of the initia-
tive process for making these changes will then be analyzed.
A. Propositions 8 and 115 Change the Moral Claims of the Character
and Hearsay Rules
The character rule removes a key substantive option from the gov-
ernment's case. Reasoning directly from the defendant's "bad" character
to prove conduct on a particular occasion, typically commission of the
crime charged, is forbidden. The premise of the character rule is that
although general character traits may be relevant to prove specific acts,
to permit this reasoning injects excessive risk of prejudice, including of-
fensive class and race stereotypes, into the proof process. Protecting
against this risk thus buttresses the essential moral foundation of our act-
based system of criminal justice. Individuals are to be held accountable
for what they do, not for who or what they are.16 In relating to the
individual, the government is not to treat people adversely on the basis of
their personhood. Some commentators link this act-oriented, prejudice-
avoiding premise of the character rule to the right to equal protection of
14. For a discussion of the values served by the character rule, see David P. Leonard, The
Use of Character to Prove Conduct: Rationality and Catharsis in the Law of Evidence, 58 U.
COLO. L. Rnv. 1, 15-31 (1986-87); Mendez, supra note 6, at 1006-09. For a discussion of the
values served by the hearsay rule, see Roger Park, The Hearsay Rule and the Stability of
Verdicts: A Response to Professor Nesson, 70 MiNN. L. REv. 1057 (1986).
15. For a description of the function of the character rule, see Edward J. Imwinkelried,
The Use of Evidence of an Accused's Uncharged Misconduct to Prove Mens Rea: The Doctrines
Which Threaten to Engulf the Character Evidence Prohibition, 51 OHIo ST. L.J. 575, 580-82
(1990); Leonard, supra note 14, at 15-25. For a description of the function of the hearsay rule,
see Eleanor Swift, Abolishing the Hearsay Rule, 75 CAL. L. REv. 495, 518-19 (1987).
16. See Mendez, supra note 6, at 1007 (person may not be punished for bad reputation,
unpopular thoughts or past actions).
April 1992]
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the laws;7 others to fundamental fairness and due process." While the
rule has important qualifications in its application, to abandon it whole-
sale is to abandon these values altogether.
The hearsay rule limits the government's use of secondhand sources
of knowledge to prove its case against the defendant. A person with
knowledge of disputed facts, whether victim or eyewitness, must appear
as a live witness at trial unless the person's out-of-court statement fits
within a categorical hearsay exception. A special limit on the govern-
ment's use of hearsay is set by the federal Constitution through the Con-
frontation Clause, which has been interpreted to require, at least in some
instances, a showing that the hearsay declarant is not available to be a
live witness. 9
Preference for live testimony sets a moral limit on our process of
trial. The presence of a live witness, who meets the accused face to face,
requires the exercise of that individual's conscience for the government
to obtain a judgment of guilt. Interposing the personal moral responsi-
bility of witnesses as accusers between the individual defendant and the
state is fundamental to the fairness of criminal trials.20 It restrains the
government against using faceless accusers as a convenient tactical strat-
egy and prevents the development of government systems of harassment
through the criminal process in contrast, for example, with the type of
"smear campaign" that characterized the era of McCarthyism.
Removing some or all of the restrictions imposed by the character
and hearsay rules will inevitably lead to the government's increased use
of both types of proof. The process may be gradual, slowed perhaps by
17. "One of the central tenets of our litigation system is that a person's general character
may not serve as a basis for a denial of civil rights or imprisonment; all citizens are entitled to
the equal protection of the laws. The character rules implement this trial administration pol-
icy." RONALD L. CARLSON ET AL, EVIDENCE IN THE NINETIES 450 (1991).
18. This is how Professor Mendez reads Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469 (1948).
See Mendez, supra note 6, at 1013-15.
19. But see White v. Illinois, 112 S. Ct. 736 (1992), which recently confined the unavaila-
bility requirement of Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), to its own facts (hearsay statements
made during prior judicial proceeding). White, 112 S. Ct. at 737. The Court in White held
that unavailability was not a requirement of the Confrontation Clause for spontaneous state-
ments and statements made "in the course of procuring medical services." Id. at 742-43.
Under its reasoning, these two types of out-of-court statements have sufficient guarantees of
reliability and cannot be duplicated by the declarant later testifying in court. It is not yet clear
whether all hearsay admitted under an established exception is similarly free of the require-
ment of unavailability, although the Court implies this. Id. Thus, for hearsay not within an
exception, and perhaps for other types of admissible hearsay yet to be determined, the prefer-
ence for live testimony still holds.
20. See generally Eileen A. Scallen, Constitutional Dimensions of Hearsay Reform: Toward
a Three-Dimensional Confrontation Clause, 76 MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 1992) (asserting
ethical basis for Confrontation Clause). But see Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1017-19 (1988).
[Vol. 25:649
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the reluctance of prosecutors and judges to abandon the morality of the
system they have practiced since law school. Indeed, nine years after the
passage of Proposition 8, the question whether it has definitely abolished
the character rule has not yet been decided by the California Supreme
Court.2 ' However, changes in the rules eventually change the attitudes
of judges, and the attitudes of judges change the attitudes of lawyers.22
When this occurs, increased use of character and hearsay evidence by the
prosecutor will reduce the degree to which the concept of individual re-
sponsibility for conduct can provide the moral basis for conviction and
punishment. In the meantime, and at a minimum, the state reduces its
official stance in favor of these foundational moral values.
B. Propositions 8 and 115 Change the Burdens Imposed by the
Character and Hearsay Rules
Removing the restrictions imposed by the character and hearsay
rules will increase the burdens on criminal defendants. This change will
affect the fairness of criminal trials, in addition to its obvious effect on
outcomes-shorter preliminary hearings and more convictions. The
heavy burden on the government-proof beyond a reasonable doubt-is
an established due process right. Changes in the law that shift any of this
burden to the defendant should be understood as affecting the fundamen-
tal fairness of criminal trials.23
Both the character and hearsay rules limit the government's ability
to choose its proof solely to serve its own narrow self-interest; that is, to
win its case efficiently. Thus, the rules have increased the government's
burden of litigating relative to the defendant. The government has had to
find strategies other than proving the defendant's bad character, which
might often be a winning tactic; and the government has had to present
many of its primary sources of knowledge live, subject to the defendant's
21. The California Supreme Court reserved this question in People v. Harris, 47 Cal. 3d
1047, 1080-82, 767 P.2d 619, 641, 255 Cal. Rptr. 352, 373-74 (1989) (holding that addition of
§ 28(d) to article I of the California Constitution abolished all exclusionary rules relating to
witness credibility). Two arguments against a finding of abolition have been made. The first is
that by preserving Evidence Code § 1103 explicitly, § 28(d) preserved § 1101 (the basic char-
acter rule of exclusion) by implication. People v. Perkins, 159 Cal. App. 3d 646, 650, 205 Cal.
Rptr. 625, 627 (1984). The second is that an amendment to the Evidence Code in 1986, passed
by more than a two-thirds vote of each house in the state legislature, effected a reenactment of
§ 1101. People v. Scott, 194 Cal. App. 3d 550, 553, 239 Cal. Rptr. 588, 591-92 (1987).
22. See, e.g., RICHARD 0. LEMPERT & STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG, A MODERN APPROACH
To EVIDENCE 524 (2d ed. 1982).
23. See, eg., Mills v. Superior Court, 42 Cal. 3d 951, 959, 728 P.2d 211, 215-16, 232 Cal.
Rptr. 141, 145 (1986) (holding that improperly easing prosecutor's task of establishing prob-
able cause at preliminary hearings violates defendant's due process rights).
April 1992]
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immediate cross-examination, rather than as hearsay declarants insulated
from such confrontation.
Abolition of the character rule under Proposition 8 increases the
burden of defense in at least three obvious ways. First, the government is
free to raise the issue of the defendant's bad character in its case-in-chief,
through any relevant means, whenever it believes it to be tactically expe-
dient to do so. Presentation of evidence as to character then permits
character to be argued to the jury. The risk to the defendant of ignoring
this line of attack, and the burden of trying to rebut it, are very high.
Second, if the government is free to use evidence of specific "bad
acts" committed by the defendant (now that character can be proved),
the defendant's burden of rebuttal is especially difficult. Either the de-
fendant submits counterproof to show that he or she did not commit the
bad acts, risking confusion and tedium for the jury, or the defendant is
pressed to take the stand either to explain away the prior acts or to at-
tempt to prove rehabilitation. If the defendant cannot do either or is a
poor witness, the government's attack on character goes unanswered.
Finally, if the defendant does take the stand, the defendant's credi-
bility is at issue and Proposition 8 makes all relevant evidence as to un-
truthfulness admissible for impeachment purposes, including specific acts
of untruthfulness as well as prior felonies. Thus, the choice to testify is
now far more risky than under prior law.
The lenient "law officer" exception to the hearsay rule established
by Proposition 115 also increases the criminal defendant's burden. First,
and most obviously, the government's use of police officers to testify at
preliminary hearings about inculpatory hearsay statements made to them
shields the hearsay declarant and precludes the defendant from obtaining
important information to prepare for trial. The defendant cannot ob-
serve the declarant testifying, and cannot evaluate the declarant's credi-
bility and effectiveness as a potential trial witness. The defendant cannot
cross-examine the declarant to learn more about his or her story, or to
obtain facts necessary to impeach the declarant's statement at trial.
While some facts about the declarant may be gleaned from cross-
examining the police officer,2" Proposition 115 insulates the declarant
himself by adding section 1203.1 to the Evidence Code. Under this sec-
24. The California Supreme Court has recently upheld the constitutional validity of using
"law officer" hearsay at preliminary hearings. Whitman v. Superior Court, 54 Cal. 3d 1063,
820 P.2d 262, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 160 (1991). The court's opinion in Whitman limits the exception
to testimony from police officers who have been involved in the investigation of the alleged
crime, and who have "sufficient knowledge of the crime or the circumstances under which the
out-of-court statement was made." Id. at 1075, 820 P.2d at 267, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 166-67.
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tion, the defendant may not call the declarants in "law officer" hearsay as
adverse witnesses at the preliminary hearing in order to cross-examine
them. The inability to question key prosecution witnesses at the prelimi-
nary hearing increases the defendant's burden of preparing for trial.
Other sources of knowledge about the witnesses must be obtained; cross-
examination must be attempted cold. It is even possible that the govern-
ment may not ever have to present key adverse witnesses at trial if it can
introduce their hearsay statements. This may be possible because of
White v. Illinois,"5 which recently held that a child victim's hearsay-at
least excited utterances and statements to a treating physician-are ad-
missible under the United States Constitution's Confrontation Clause
without any showing of the child declarant's unavailability. After White,
a defendant in California can be charged on the basis of a victim's hear-
say statement made to a law officer (admitted at the preliminary hear-
ing), and convicted on the basis of hearsay-excited utterances or
medical statements-made to others by the same victim (admitted at
trial). The government would never have to produce the victim as a wit-
ness in its case. 6 The burden, which has thus shifted onto the defendant
to investigate, prepare and present information to discredit the declarant,
or to risk calling the deelarant as a witness at trial, is heavy indeed.27
V. How DID THE CHARACTER RULE AND THE HEARSAY RULE
GET SUBMITTED TO A POPULAR VOTE AND PASSED BY
THE ELECTORATE?
California has always been an important locus of what has come to
be known as the victims' rights movement.2" A political platform in
25. 112 S. Ct. 736 (1992).
26. This is not an improbable scenario, as the facts in White demonstrate. The child vic-
tim in White made several hearsay statements: to her baby sitter, mother, a police officer and
finally to medical personnel. Id.
27. See Swift, supra note 15, at 514-16. Pretrial depositions are available only upon a
showing that a material witness is about to leave the state, is ill or infirm, or is in jeopardy.
CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1336-1337 (West Supp. 1992).
28. California passed the first statute providing for state compensation for innocent vic-
tims of violent crime in 1965. Act of September 17, 1965, ch. 1549, 1965 CAL. STAT. 3641-42,
repealed by Act of November 8, 1967, ch. 1546, § 2, 1967 CAL. STAT. 3707, 3709. The Na-
tional Organization for Victim Assistance (NOVA), an umbrella group coordinating victim
advocacy efforts, was founded in Fresno in 1976. For a discussion of these and other early
events in the movement, see Frank Carrington & George Nicholson, The Victims' Movement:
An Idea Whose Time Has Come, 11 PEPP. L. REv. 1 (1984); Lynne N. Henderson, The
Wrongs of Victim's Rights, 37 STAN. L. REv. 937 (1985). This issue of the Pepperdine Law
Review is, in fact, a symposium of articles on victims' rights which were commissioned by the
United States Department of Justice's National Institute of Justice. See Letters of Introduc-
tion, 11 PEPP. L. REv. at xiii (1984).
April 19923
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favor of increasing the visibility of crime victims, establishing funds for
their compensation, protecting them from callous treatment and giving
them a right to be heard in the criminal justice process, has attracted
large numbers of voters over the past ten years. Fueled perhaps by the
"rights consciousness" of the 1960s and 1970s, by "[t]he tidal wave of
crime' ' 21 in America during that same time and by "the decline of sup-
port for liberal approaches" to crime,3" a victim's rights platform was
adopted by President Reagan's Task Force on Victims of Crime in 1982,
and implemented by Congress's passage of the Victim and Witness Pro-
tection Act of 198231 and the Victims of Crime Act of 1984.32 It has
been primarily in California, however, that an attack on the procedural
rights of criminal defendants has been incorporated into the victims'
rights political agenda.
Both Proposition 8 (known as the Victims' Bill of Rights) and Prop-
osition 115 (known as the Crime Victim's Justice Reform Initiative)
presented the voters with a list of constitutional and statutory amend-
ments packaged as protections for the rights of crime victims. Proposi-
tion 8 did include aspects of the more traditional platform. It amended
the California Constitution, Penal Code and Welfare and Institutions
Code to provide for victims' right of restitution and right to participate in
sentencing and parole hearings.33 However, the bulk of the Proposition
targeted defendants' rights. It made granting bail a matter of discretion
rather than a matter of right, provided for mandatory enhancement of
sentences for prior felonies, restricted the use of evidence to prove dimin-
ished capacity, restricted plea bargaining for specified felonies and for
offenses of driving while intoxicated and protected eighteen-year-olds
from being sentenced to Youth Authority upon the commission of speci-
fied crimes.34 Newsweek magazine called Proposition 8 a "counter-Con-
29. Carrington & Nicholson, supra note 28, at 4.
30. Henderson, supra note 28, at 945.
31. Pub. L. No. 97-291, 96 Stat. 1248 (codified as amended at FED. R. Civ. P. 32 and in
scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.). 18 U.S.C. §§ 1512-1515, 3663-3664 (1988) provides for victim
impact statements at sentencing, protection from intimidation, restitution from offenders,
guidelines for fair treatment in federal criminal cases, and general tightening of bail laws.
32. Pub. L. No. 98-473, §§ 1401-1410, 98 Stat. 2170, 2170-78 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 10601-10604 and in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.). 42 U.S.C. § 10601 (1988) es-
tablishes victim compensation fund from fines assessed in federal convictions.
33. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(b) (right to restitution); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1191.1,
3043 (West 1983 & Supp. 1992) (right to participate in sentencing); CAL. WELF. & INST.
CODE § 1767 (West 1984) (right to participate in parole hearings).
34. See CAL. CONT. art. I § 28(e) (bail); CAL. PENAL CODE § 667 (West 1988 & Supp.
1992) (enhancement of sentence); id. § 25 (West 1988) (diminished capacity); id. § 1192.7
(West 1982 & Supp. 1992) (plea bargaining); CAL. WELF. & INT. CODE § 1732.5 (West 1984)
(18-year-old and older offenders).
[Vol. 25:649
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stitution."' a The changes in evidence law were thus only part of this
larger anti-crime and victims' rights package.
Proposition 115 was, if anything, even broader in scope. It required
that, in criminal cases, rights under the California Constitution "shall
not be construed by the courts to afford greater rights to criminal defend-
ants than those afforded by the Constitution of the United States."36 It
also, inter alia, abolished the right of the parties to examine prospective
jurors in'criminal cases, expanded the definition of first degree murder,
required reciprocal pretrial discovery between the prosecution and de-
fense, created the new crime of torture, added new "special circum-
stance" killings to the Penal Code, required felony trials to be set within
sixty days of arraignment, required assignment of felony cases only to
defense attorneys who would be ready to proceed within specified time
limits and restricted the courts' ability to prohibit joinder of criminal
cases on a number of grounds.37 The proposals to streamline the pretrial
process, and to prevent victims from having to testify at preliminary
hearings, were identified as protecting victims' rights. Again, the evi-
dence law changes pertaining to preliminary hearings were only a part of
the package.
Among the originators of Proposition 8 were a bipartisan group of
state legislators and George Nicholson, Executive Director of the Cali-
fornia District Attorneys Association.38 Their efforts were joined by the
Committee to Stop Crime, led by Paul Gann (architect of the "taxpayers'
revolt" known as Proposition 13). Then-Attorney General George
Deukmejian, as Republican candidate for California governor, cam-
paigned for the Proposition, strongly endorsed it in the voters' pamphlet
mailed to all voters, and subsequently won the election.
The initial drafters and organizers of the campaign for the measures
underlying Proposition 115 also included prosecutors from Orange, Kern
and Los Angeles counties. Although their organizing efforts were aided
35. Aric Press & Joe Contreras, A Victim's Bill of Rights, NEWSWEEK, June 14, 1982, at
64.
36. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 24. This provision was denied effect by the California Supreme
Court in Raven v. Deukmejian, 52 Cal. 3d 336, 355, 801 P.2d 1077, 1089, 276 Cal. Rptr. 326,
338 (1990), on the ground that it amounted to an impermissible revision, not amendment, of
the California Constitution.
37. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 30(c); CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 223 (West Supp. 1992)
(examination of jurors); CAL. PENAL CODE § 189 (West Supp. 1989) (first degree murder); id.
§ 1054-1054.7 (West Supp. 1992) (reciprocal discovery); id. § 206 (West Supp. 1992) (torture);
id. § 190.5(b) (West Supp. 1992) (special circumstances); id. § 1049.5 (West Supp. 1992) (set-
ting trial); id. § 987.05 (West Supp. 1992) (assignment of defense counsel); id. §§ 954.1, 1050.1
(West Supp. 1992) (joinder).
38. Gann, supra note 2, at 69.70.
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by prosecutors statewide, they did not secure enough signatures to qual-
ify for the ballot.39 However, the political value of a tough anti-crime
initiative became apparent in 1989. Then-Senator Pete Wilson, the Re-
publican candidate for governor, threw his support behind the measure.40
Former San Francisco Mayor Dianne Feinstein, running for Governor as
a Democrat, also backed the initiative while another Democratic candi-
date in the primary, John Van de Kamp, opposed it. Wilson's campaign
was successful.
VI. WHO SHOULD BE IN CHARGE OF EVIDENCE LAW? THE
DIRECT POPULAR INITIATIVE Is NOT SUITED FOR MAKING
CHANGES THAT AFFECT THE MORAL CLAIMS OF
EVIDENCE LAW AND THE BALANCE OF
BURDENS IT IMPOSES
Traditionally, adjudication and legislation have been the legal mech-
anisms by which value conflicts related to the proof process in criminal
(and civil) trials have been resolved. Evidence law, first judge-made and
then codified, is the result. The supporters of Propositions 8 and 115
claimed that their initiatives brought the absent voices, interests and val-
ues of actual and potential victims into the lawmaking process.
In a democracy, there is tension between acknowledging the legiti-
macy of the public's value judgments in policy and lawmaking and recog-
nizing that those value judgments should be based on a decision-making
process involving information, competence and experience that are usu-
ally the province of elites. Thus, the adequacy of the initiative process,
and its differences from adjudication and legislation, can be evaluated
wholly apart from disagreements about substance. The initiative process
for Propositions 8 and 115 was not well-suited for making considered
decisions about the moral basis of the character and hearsay rules, or
about the balance of burdens they establish.
39. See generally Jerry Hicks, Court Reform Measure Raises Controversy, L.A. TIMES (Or-
ange County ed.), May 28, 1990, at BI (describing early organization of Proposition 115 by
prosecutors, crime victims and politicians).
40. "Early campaign contributions of some $800,000-essentially Wilson campaign
money rerouted, the Los Angeles Times said in an anti-Proposition 115 editorial-let the pros-
ecutors hire professional signature gatherers who got the measure on the ballot." Gail Diane
Cox, California Passes Justice Reform Act, NAT'L L.J., June 18, 1990, at 3, 38.
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A. Supporters of the Propositions Claimed that Constitutional and
Legislative Change Was Necessary Because Victims' Rights
Had Been Undervalued in the Criminal Justice
System
Supporters of both Propositions claimed that using popular initia-
tives to reform the criminal justice system was legitimate because the
judicial and legislative processes had for too long not taken adequate ac-
count of victims' interests. They appealed to two different platforms
under the rubric of victims' rights. First, they sought legal recognition
that there exists a private, bipolar dispute between crime victims and per-
petrators. As described above, the proposals for victim participation in
sentencing and parole hearings, for restitution, and for nonparticipation
in preliminary hearings were directed at this vision of a "private" dispute
underlying the public dispute between the prosecution and the defendant.
Victims were acknowledged as actual participants in a legal process trig-
gered by events that happened to them, much as tort victims have rights
against tortfeasors.
However, most of the constitutional and statutory changes in both
Propositions 8 and 115 did not vindicate these private interests, but re-
flected the second platform backed by the supporters-an attack on de-
fendants' procedural rights in the criminal justice system.4" By reducing
the procedural rights of criminal defendants, criminals "will be appropri-
ately detained in custody, tried by the courts, and sufficiently pun-
ished,"'4  which will keep "society as a whole ... free from the fear of
crime in our homes, neighborhoods, and schools."43 The supporters
used the image of future victimization to appeal to the interests of the
general public in stopping crime, particularly violent crime directed
against individuals.' The judiciary in particular was criticized for going
too far in protecting the rights of persons accused of crimes, and for un-
dervaluing interests of the law-abiding public in securing convictions and
adequate punishment. The state legislature, according to the supporters,
41. Professor Henderson also differentiates this second platform from the first: "[G]enuine
questions about victims and victimization have become increasingly coopted by the concerns of
advocates of the 'crime control' model of criminal justice." Henderson, supra note 28, at 95 1.
Victims, she notes, have no more "right" to say how the government shall enforce the criminal
law than any other segment of the population. Id. at 986.
42. CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET, PRIMARY ELECTION JUNE 8, 1982, at 33, reprinted
in I STATUTES OF CALIFORNIA AND DIGESTS OF MEASURES at A-186 (1982); see CAL.
CONST. art. I, § 28.
43. CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET, PRIMARY ELECTION JUNE 5, 1990, at 33.
44. Some of this argumentation has been labelled "cynical manipulation of victim's rights"
when the procedural right attacked-for example the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule-
has no demonstrable effect on controlling crime. Henderson, supra note 28, at 982-86.
April 1992]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
had been unresponsive to numerous measures proposed to correct the
balance of these public values prior to Proposition 8." Thus, having ex-
hausted their legislative remedies, the supporters sought another avenue,
the direct popular initiative, to change the constitution and the laws gov-
erning the criminal trial process.
It does not appear that a concerted but unsuccessful effort was made
to sponsor legislation similar to Proposition 115.46 Thus, Propositions 8
and 115 may reflect differing applications of the principle that exhaustion
of political remedies justifies recourse to the direct popular initiative.
But even were the exhaustion argument wholly valid, it does not follow
that any and every resort to an initiative is thereby legitimized. Legiti-
macy should derive from the ability of voters to vote meaningfully and
knowledgeably on the issues presented.
B. The Direct Initiative Is Not Generally Used to Enact Changes in
Evidence Law
The initiative power in California is provided for in the California
Constitution. Under article IV, section 1 of the California Constitution,
"the people reserve to themselves the powers of initiative and referen-
dum,"'47 a right viewed as " 'one of the most precious rights of our demo-
cratic process.' "48 The legislature plays no role in drafting or
commenting upon proposals that are placed on the ballot through peti-
tion. Judicial review of the passage and adoption of these measures, as
opposed to the validity of their operation in concrete cases, is usually
45. Paul Gann charged that "efforts to modify California Supreme Court decisions in the
State legislature were personally thwarted by Assembly Speaker Leo McCarthy and a small
but potent committee, the Assembly Criminal Justice Committee, which he structured and
controlled by maintaining a majority of liberal idealogues as members." Gann, supra note 2,
at 69. It is correct that from 1977 to 1982 legislation to restrict the rights of defendants was
proposed by future Proposition 8 supporters but failed in the Assembly, including measures to
enhance criminal sentences, Cal. A.B. 387, 1977-78 Reg. Sess. (1977), restrict bail, provide for
reciprocal discovery, limit the California Constitution's protections to those afforded by the
federal one, Cal. Ass. Const. Amend. No. 77, 1977-78 Reg. Sess. (1978), and expand the use of
character evidence by the prosecution, Cal. A.B. 1286, 1981-82 Reg. Sess. (1981). However,
measures to provide rights of restitution, notification and participation to crime victims re-
ceived bipartisan support from 1977 to 1982, including that of Speaker McCarthy. See, e.g.,
Cal. A.B. 3015, 1979-80 Reg. Sess. 1980.
46. Only one such effort to "push a court reform package through the Legislature" is
mentioned in the news coverage. See Hicks, supra note 39, at B12.
47. CAL. CONsT. art. IV, § 1.
48. Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 22 Cal. 3d
208, 248, 583 P.2d 1281, 1302, 149 Cal. Rptr. 239, 259 (1978) (quoting Associated Home
Builders v. City of Livermore, 18 Cal. 3d 582, 591, 557 P.2d 473, 477, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41, 45
(1976)).
[Vol. 25:649
April 1992] WHO'S IN CHARGE?
limited to the requirement that they embrace but one "subject," 4 9 that
the text disclose "the full purpose and effect of [the] provisions"50 and
that they amend but not revise the California Constitution.51
Popular initiative power exists throughout the United States, but it
has not been generally used to enact or reform the law of evidence.
Twenty-two states, including California, permit either the proposal of
legislation, or amendment or revision of the state constitution through
ballot initiatives. 52 Only in scattered instances has the initiative power
been used to address problems of criminal justice, such as applying the
death penalty to certain felonies or permitting indictments by grand
jury.
53
Arizona, Michigan and Florida have passed victims' rights initia-
tives that amend their state constitutions. All three of these initiatives
reflect the traditional platform of the victims' rights movement-the
rights to be informed, to be present and to be heard at relevant stages of
the criminal prosecution-but do not contain any specific changes in evi-
dence law.
54
49. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8(d).
50. See Brosnahan v. Brown, 32 Cal. 3d 236, 282, 651 P.2d 274, 302, 186 Cal. Rptr. 30, 59
(1982) (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
51. The legislature may propose amendment or revision of the constitution, while an initi-
ative may only amend. Id. at 289, 651 P.2d at 307, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 63 (Bird, C.J.,
dissenting).
52. See LAURA TALLIAN, DIRECT DEMOCRACY: AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE INI-
TIATIVE, REFERENDUM, AND RECALL PROCESS 45 (1977); see also Michael G. Colantuono,
Comment, The Revision of American State Constitutions: Legislative Power, Popular Sover-
eignty, and Constitutional Change, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1473, 1477 n.24 (1987) (discussing neces-
sity of state constitutional change and constitutional processes for accomplishing change).
53. In 1977 the Congressional Research Service published a report that compiled all state
initiatives that had reached the ballot between 1898 and 1977. THOMAS DURBIN, INITIATIVE
REFERENDUM AND RECALL: A RESUME OF STATE PROVISIONS, reprinted in Proposed Voter
Initiative Constitutional Amendment: Hearings on S.J. Res. 67 Before the Subcomm. on the
Constitution of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 280 (updated by Rita
Ann Reimer, 1977). A survey of scattered information on the initiative measures passed since
1977 shows that more frequently initiative activities have addressed abortion, land use, casino
gambling, financial disclosure, campaign spending, school busing, taxation, educational spend-
ing, nuclear disarmament, legislative apportionment and English as the official language. In
the investigation of initiative subjects for this paper, we found no other initiatives that enacted
new evidence law.
54. The Florida amendment provided for these rights "to the extent that these rights do
not interfere with the constitutional rights of the accused." FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16(b). The
Michigan amendment added the "right to be treated with fairness and respect for their dignity
and privacy," the "right to timely disposition of the case following arrest of the accused," and
the "right to restitution." MICH. CONST. art. I, § 24(1).
The Arizona amendment did mention the law of evidence. It encompassed all of the
rights in the traditional platform and in the Florida and Michigan Constitutions. It added the
victim's right to "refuse an interview, deposition, or other discovery request by the defendant"
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But with the success of Propositions 8 and 115 in California, the use
of initiatives to change evidence law may be spreading. In 1990 an
amendment to the Oregon Constitution was proposed by initiative under
the ballot title "New Constitutional Provision Gives Crime Victims
Rights, Expands Admissible Evidence."" The initiative was removed
from the ballot prior to being voted upon, but petitions to place a similar
measure on the ballot in 1992 are currently circulating. The Oregon
measure proposes to grant to crime victims the "right to have all relevant
evidence admissible against the criminal defendant," preserving only the
limits set by statutory hearsay and privilege rules.5 6 Thus, the changes in
evidence law proposed for the Oregon Constitution could go beyond
those adopted under Propositions 8 and 115 in California.
C. The Initiative Process Does Not Provide Considered Attention to
Evidence Law Changes
It is highly likely that California voters did not base their decision to
vote for or against Proposition 8 or Proposition 115 upon the changes
worked to the character and hearsay rules. Both propositions presented
multiple constitutional and statutory provisions related to the processing
of criminal cases, many of which were more visible to voters. In both
campaigns, a particular provision was emphasized by supporters or crit-
ics, or otherwise captured the attention of the media. For Proposition 8,
repeal of the California exclusionary rule, limitations on plea bargaining
and the right to "safe schools" received the most attention.57 For Propo-
sition 115, the costs of the measure and the effect on abortion rights were
most heavily publicized."
In the pamphlet sent to voters prior to the Proposition 8 election,
the possible changes to the character rule were not even mentioned in the
analysis provided by the legislative analyst. The pamphlet arguments fo-
cused on the virtues of cracking down on criminal offenders versus the
and the victim's right to "have all rules governing criminal procedure and the admissibility of
evidence in all criminal proceedings protect victims' rights." ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 2.1(A), cls.
5, 11 (emphasis added).
55. Proposed OR. CONST. art. I, § 41.
56. Id. at § 41(1)(b), (3); see also Shepard v. Roberts, 802 P.2d 654, 654-55 n.1 (Or. 1990)
(setting forth full text of initiative proposal).
57. See, eg., California's Backfire on Crime, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 1982, at 18; Robert
Lindsey, California Voting on Criminal Laws, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 1982, § 1, at 11.
58. "The furor over the abortion issue, unfortunately, has diverted public attention from
the remaining 99 percent of the initiative, which proposes major changes in California's crimi-
nal justice system." William Carlsen, Abortion Issue is Complicating Prop 115's Chance of
Passing, S.F. CHRON., May 28, 1990, at A6.
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vices of "mangling" constitutional rights.5 9 The analysis of Proposition
115 mentioned only generally that hearsay evidence would be allowed at
preliminary hearings without spelling out the consequences, while the
pamphlet arguments largely debated the effects on privacy and abortion
rights in California. Thus it seems unrealistic to claim that the specific
evidence law changes were considered, let alone considered carefully, by
the voters.6
In contrast, when evidence law is developed through adjudication,
the adversary system usually insures that careful, considered attention is
paid to important changes in the law. Such changes are formulated by
judges on the basis of competing doctrinal solutions to problems of proof
presented by adversaries. The judge's decision is case-specific. The judge
focuses on the likely concrete effects of the evidence change he or she is
being asked to make. The adversaries present specific arguments about
benefits and costs to the particular parties, and they may also present
generalized arguments as to the possible broad or long-term effects on
other cases to illuminate the policy choices that are at stake.
The legislative process, too, directs considered attention to conflicts
in interests and values when evidence codes are enacted and changed.
Proposals are addressed by a wide variety of participants, including both
legislators and interest groups. The Federal Rules, for example, were
drafted by an advisory committee made up of prominent judges, lawyers
and academicians. Drafts were circulated to larger professional groups
throughout the country, leading to significant review and revision. The
final draft was then reviewed by the Supreme Court and both houses in
59. The statement by Attorney General George Deukmejian concluded as follows: "There
is absolutely no question that the passage of this proposition will result in more criminal con-
victions, more criminals being sentenced to state prison, and more protection for the law-
abiding citizenry." CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET, PRIMARY ELECTION JUNE 8, 1982, at
34 (arguments in favor of Proposition 8). The argument against Proposition 8 stated that
"Proposition 8 is so badly written it mangles nearly every aspect of the criminal justice system
it touches." Id. at 35 (arguments against Proposition 8).
60. This concern lies at the heart of Chief Justice Bird's dissent in Brosnahan v. Brown, 32
Cal. 3d 236, 262, 651 P.2d 274, 290, 186 Cal. Rptr. 30, 46 (1982) (Bird, C.J., dissenting). The
single-subject rule, she explained, was intended to dispel the dangers of voter confusion, inade-
quate notice and logrolling. Id. at 265-67, 651 P.2d at 291-93, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 47-49 (Bird,
C.J., dissenting). Without reading it as demanding interdependency among ballot provisions,
Bird argued, the single-subject rule was rendered meaningless. Id. at 273, 651 P.2d at 296, 186
Cal. Rptr. at 53 (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
Initiatives which embrace more than one subject weaken rather than strengthen a
citizen's right to vote. They threaten to undermine the integrity and strength of the
whole initiative process. If the voters are confused or misled, or if they vote for or
against a proposal because they favor or oppose one or two of its provisions, the
initiative process has not served to implement the will of the people.
Id. at 281, 651 P.2d at 301, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 57 (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
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Congress, resulting in much debate and many revisions of particularly
controversial sections.
There is no assurance that comparable consideration can be given in
the initiative process. Voters, of course, are not experienced experts in
the field of evidence. Political literature and news analyses do not detail
the consequences of technical changes in the law. Moreover, evidence
law changes are lost in the shuffle of bigger issues. Voters' attention may
be even further diluted by the political stakes attached to initiatives like
Propositions 8 and 115. Both were used by politicians running hard for
governor of California on "tough on crime" platforms. Thus political
preferences for one candidate or the other, having nothing to do with
evidence law or even with the criminal justice system, may have deter-
mined how people voted. It is wrong to make changes in evidence law
without giving them considered attention.
D. The Initiatives Distort Decision-Making About the Moral Claims of
Evidence Law
There is special cause for concern about subjecting moral questions,
like those posed by cutting back on the character and hearsay rules, to
the initiative process. First, as argued above, these rules make important
defining contributions to our justice system. The morality of a system of
government does not derive solely from its outputs, but also from the
substantive principles-here the equality of persons, government neutral-
ity toward persons and individual accountability-that constrain its op-
erations. Propositions 8 and 115 attacked the system's alleged outputs-
delays, acquittals, insufficient punishment-and posed the moral choice
as being between public safety and coddling criminals. Crime control
goals are important and do raise moral choices in which the public
should participate. But these choices do not effectively translate into the
moral claims of the character and hearsay rules. It is wrong to allow the
claims of these rules to get lost in the translation.
Second, moral deliberation requires just that: deliberation from a
disinterested point of view about what is right. The appeal to public fear
of violent crime made by the supporters of Propositions 8 and 115 dis-
torted the public's point of view. It appealed to emotion.6 It put the
61. One criminal defense attorney ... recalls spending an evening explaining the nuts
and bolts of the measure [Proposition 115] and trying to get across to an audience the
idea that, as a disincentive for defendants to plea bargain, the measure could produce
more trials and add to costs.
The same night, a 30-second Proposition 115 spot starred a horribly scarred boy
whose father... had just been paroled after serving less than eight years for having
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question to its audience in highly charged, self-interested terms.62 It is
wrong to change the moral basis of evidence principles through a deci-
sion-making process ill-suited to moral choices.
Finally, the moral values attached to respecting the personhood of
criminal defendants and restraining the use of faceless accusers are frag-
ile. The risks of bias against repeat offenders and of relying on hearsay
declarants are familiar to lawyers, but may not be meaningful to lay per-
sons, until perhaps they encounter a process infused with these risks in
their own experience.63 The point of moral deliberation is, then, to tap
into the sources of conflicting values in an effort to resolve them, not to
overwhelm them with fears and frustration."4 These moral values are
particularly susceptible to abuse in the political process. Politics dehu-
manizes individual defendants, subjects them to stereotyping, or turns
them into the "crime problem." Yet the claims made by the character
and hearsay rules relate to the defendant's humanity, and are at risk of
being drowned out by instrumental arguments about "solving" the prob-
lem. Even the deliberative voter is trapped by the pairing of legitimate
large anti-crime goals, and the large number of particular solutions pro-
posed, with the fragile moral claims of the character and hearsay rules.
The judiciary and the legislature use procedures that better address
the important moral questions involved in evidence law. The adversary
system focuses the judge on the important questions. Its argument and
counterargument methodology permits informed deliberation. The eth-
ics of the judicial role demand that the judge adopt a disinterested point
of view and give reasons for each ruling. Although they do not guaran-
set him afire. The defense attorney complained it was impossible for any explanation
of the measure to compete with that.
Cox, supra note 40, at 38.
62. "Gann is quite open about building on public fears. 'The government is not protecting
the people,' he says. It is 'turning vicious criminals loose every day.'" Press & Contreras,
supra note 35, at 64. At a news conference for Proposition 115, Senator Pete Wilson was
"[s]tanding before a semicircle of people who have been victims of violent crime or who have
lost loved ones to murderers, [saying] California's criminal justice system is 'needlessly lenient'
on alleged criminals." Catherine Gewertz, Wilson Opens Drive for Crime Measure, L.A.
TIMES, February 6, 1990, at B2.
63. For example, some observers of the Senate Judiciary Committee Hearings on the nom-
ination of Judge Clarence Thomas to the United States Supreme Court were disturbed by
procedures they had not seen before, such as the lack of confrontation between Judge Thomas
and Professor Anita Hill, Judge Thomas's refusal to submit to full cross-examination, and the
use of "past acts" to impeach Professor Hill's credibility.
64. The prosecution of William Kennedy Smith for sexual battery has also put a spotlight
on the character rule. The Florida trial judge refused to admit evidence concerning both the
accuser's sexual history and specific incidents of the defendant's sexual conduct. The pros and
cons of using such evidence to prove or disprove consensual sex can be fully debated only after
analysis of the logical, empirical, procedural and moral issues involved.
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tee it, these attributes of adjudication make possible considered judg-
ments about what is right. And while the legislature is not always
thought of as a repository of moral wisdom, its deliberative processes
include inputs on moral questions far broader than common law adjudi-
cation. Legislators are familiar with both sides of the issues in evidence
law. For example, the moral issuei underlying Federal Rule of Evidence
609 on felony impeachment were debated in Congress along with the
practical arguments pro and con.65
There are ways to utilize the greater institutional competence of the
judiciary and legislature while increasing the weight given to the interests
of victims. The victims' rights initiatives in Florida and Arizona appear
to keep the judicial branch in the role of mediating between the moral
claims made on the criminal justice system by both victims and defend-
ants.6 6 This is congruent with moral deliberation and makes decision
makers more responsive to a larger set of relevant values which are still
within their judicial competence.
E. The Initiative Process Distorts Decision Making About the Balance
of Burdens in Evidence Law
There is also special cause for concern about making evidence law
changes through the initiative process that have an important effect on
the balance of relative burdens between the prosecution and the defend-
ant. The balance of burdens establishes the framework for the competi-
tive relationship between the two sides of the adversarial criminal trial.
Since the government is one side of this relationship, setting the balance
raises a moral question of fairness and a legal question of due process.
Deciding the moral question through the initiative process is subject to
all of the concerns just stated above.
In addition, it is unfair for changes in this competitive relationship
to be drafted exclusively by one side-the prosecution-and then im-
65. The debate between Senators McClellan and Hart, quoted in 3 DAVID W. LOUISELL &
CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 314,,at 300-12 (1979), posed the moral
issue as a conflict between society's "right to know" and the potential victimization of the
person with a prior criminal record.
66. The Florida amendment provided that victims' rights not interfere with the constitu-
tional rights of the accused. See supra note 54. The Arizona amendment abjured the judiciary
and legislature to have all rules of procedure and evidence "protect" victims' rights, thus pro-
moting consideration of these values. See supra note 54. Generally framed propositions such
as these can force courts "to strike a new balance between competing values." Joel L. Segal,
Proposition 8 and the California Supreme Court: Interpretation Run Riot?, 60 S. CAL. L. REV.
539, 540 (1987). Segal asserts that Proposition 8 can promote "ongoing moral dialogue be-
tween the court, the legislature, and the voters, in order to make the best moral judgment"
even though the "rhetoric behind [its] enactment may have been otherwise." Id.
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posed on the other-the defendant-through a "winner take all" elec-
tion. Both Propositions 8 and 115 were conceived, drafted and heavily
supported by current and former prosecutors. The content of the Pro-
positions was not mediated by compromise with competing interest
groups. No formal process of argument and counterargument, of criti-
cism and review, or of political compromise exists for privately drafted
ballot initiatives.67 The only formal constraint on the one-sidedness of
content would be the drafters' calculation of what it takes to win.6
The competition for the vote on the Propositions was also un-
mediated by the natural factionalism that exists for most political ques-
tions. Within the general public, the criminal defendant has no natural
constituency. Very few people are "pro-crime." Groups with profes-
sional and personal commitments to constitutional rights and procedural
justice did oppose both Propositions. But these are relatively abstract
interests, not bread and butter issues that are likely to get a full hearing
from the electorate.69 Again, decisions about evidence issues that have a
significant impact on a competitive relationship are ill-suited to a forum
in which there is one-sided competition.
Prosecutors' partisan sponsorship of the propositions also confuses
the conception of their role. The prosecution represents the public and is
charged with doing justice, not just winning. Prosecutors who do make
arguments for evidence rules that will improve the competition at trial
for the government's side are supposed to do so only to promote the
public good. And they are usually made where both sides are heard-
through adjudication, where the defendant is personally represented, or
through legislation, where many interest groups participate. A direct
popular appeal by prosecutors where there is no mediating influence, and
where the other side is underrepresented, undermines their role as disin-
terested representatives of the public good.
Finally, the "winner take all" nature of the initiatives destroys the
possibility for compromise over the question of the proper balance of
burdens. The voters do not choose between alternatives to current evi-
67. See Brosnahan v. Brown, 32 Cal. 3d 236, 651 P.2d 274, 186 Cal. Rptr. 30 (1982) (Bird,
C.J., dissenting).
68. "The result of this inflexibility is that more often than not a proposed initiative repre-
sents the most extreme form of law which is considered practically expedient." Schmitz v.
Younger; 21 Cal. 3d 90, 99, 577 P.2d 652, 657, 145 Cal. Rptr. 517, 522 (1978) (Manuel, J.,
dissenting).
69. One commentator has written that "it is senseless to protect the value of fairness to
defendants with conventional value judgments, when the reason we value such fairness is be-
cause conventional value judgments, do not always protect criminal defendants sufficiently."
Segal, supra note 65, at 581.
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dence rules; none is presented where some might be possible.7"
This differs sharply from how both judges and legislators arrive at
final decisions. Judge-made rules develop incrementally, on a case-by-
case basis. They are subject to critique by the parties on appeal and by
parties arguing the next case. They are subject to revision by other
judges throughout the legal system. One-sidedness cannot dominate this
process, and there is no "winner take all" solution to important fairness
questions.71
Compromise and accommodation between competing interests are
the hallmarks of the legislative process. The following description of the
process resulting in an extensive victims' rights statute in Michigan illus-
trates this point:
[A] number of criminal justice professionals in Michigan were
interested in the project and were ready to provide assistance.
Information and guidance were provided by all players in the
criminal justice arena, but the involvement of victims helped set
the standard.
Several judges, prosecutors, and members of the defense
bar provided generous amounts of time and expertise in the de-
velopment of a draft bill....
In June of 1984, a bill was formally introduced, but flaws
quickly became apparent .... Rather than consign flawed leg-
islation to a permanent pigeon hole, it was withdrawn. A five
month 'back to the drawing board' intensive review and rewrite
process followed. In January of 1985, it was reintroduced in a
refined version as House Bill 4009.
While the language of House Bill 4009 was consistent with
the concerns expressed by victims, several components were de-
70. For example, wholesale use of preventive detention (denial of bail) is not the only
solution to genuine risks of victim harassment. See, e.g., Henderson, supra note 28, at 970-86.
And, wholesale admission of "law officer" hearsay is not the only solution to the problem of
protecting victims who would suffer unduly from testifying at preliminary hearings. See, e.g.,
Maryland v. Craig, 110 S. Ct. 3157, 3158 (1990) (testimony of child sexual abuse victim via
one-way closed circuit television).
71. The famous description of the character rule by Justice Jackson in Michelson v.
United States, 335 U.S. 469, 486 (1948) illustrates its quid pro quo nature:
[Miuch of this law is archaic, paradoxical and full of compromises and compensa-
tions by which an irrational advantage to one side is offset by a poorly reasoned
counterprivilege to the other. But somehow it has proved a workable even if clumsy
system when moderated by discretionary controls in the hands of a wise and strong
trial court. To pull one misshapen stone out of the grotesque structure is more likely
simply to upset its present balance between adverse interests than to establish a ra-
tional edifice.
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veloped only after extensive brainstorming or through practical
experience.72
Proposals put forward in privately drafted initiatives are not simi-
larly tested by competing viewpoints. This is an important flaw when the
proposal itself sets the framework for fairness in competition.
VII. CONCLUSION
It is perhaps too easy for evidence professors to criticize the changes
in evidence law worked by Propositions 8 and 115. One immediate reac-
tion might be that evidence rules ought to be left to the experts-judges,
lawyers, academics and legislators. Another might be simply substantive
disagreement with the moral choices and the balance of burdens that the
Propositions enact. These responses illustrate the timeless dilemma of
"popular" interference with the judgment of professional or elite groups
that are specialists in their fields.7 3
There are, however, grounds for criticizing the initiative process
other than dismay over the transference of authority to make decisions or
the substance of the outcomes themselves. The absence of careful atten-
tion, adequate information and deliberative choice sharply distinguish
the initiative process from adjudication and legislation. Deference to
professional competence, experience and accountability are just as much
at stake as is deference to populist values. Further, the absence of delib-
erate reasoning about difficult moral claims, and the one-sided nature of
proposals about a two-sided competition, are matters of genuine concern.
The initiative process is the subject of concern and criticism on
other grounds as well.74 Study of the empirical effects of Propositions 8
and 115, as measured against their crime control aims, is called for. The
appropriateness of courts giving or denying them effect should also be
72. William Van Regenmorter, Crime Victims' Rights-A Legislative Perspective, 17 PEPP.
L. REv. 59, 60 (1989).
73. Sometimes this dilemma assumes constitutional dimensions. California Proposition 24
restructured internal procedures of the California Legislature and raised a sharp conflict be-
tween popular and representational sovereignty, and was held in large part to violate the Cali-
fornia Constitution. See James E. Castello, Comment, The Limits of Popular Sovereignty:
Using the Initiative Power to Control Legislative Procedure, 74 CAL. L. REv. 491, 493-94
(1986).
74. Traditional means of making constitutional changes are to be preferred over extratex-
tual revision because "they foster societal consensus on basic values, promote constitutional
stability, and limit majoritarianism." Colantuono, supra note 52, at 1475. Direct democracy
"is plagued by voter ignorance, voter apathy, and procedural defects, results in laws which
impede minority rights, is inefficient, and has a deleterious effect on the branches of govern-
ment." Cynthia L. Fountaine, Lousy Lawmaking: Questioning the Desirability and Constitu-
tionality of Legislating by Initiative, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 735, 737 (1988).
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examined. The impetus to put the voting public in charge of crucial
changes in evidence law is not likely to disappear, and it deserves our
attention.
